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Mary Ellen Turpel *

Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Political
Participation and Self-Determination:

Recent International Legal
Developments and the Continuing
Struggle for Recognition

Introduction
It must be recognized that indigenous populations have their own identity
rooted in historical factors which outweigh the phenomena of mere solidarity in the face of discrimination and exploitation, and that, by virtue of
their very existence, they have a natural and original right to live freely on
their own lands.'

The claims of indigenous 2 peoples have been vigorously advanced
in the post-war era internationally and within nation states in key
regions throughout the world, including the Americas, the Pacific, and

Northern Europe. The unique character of these claims has challenged
domestic and international legal and political regimes. Institutionally,
the international trusteeship and decolonization process did not address
indigenous claims. Indigenous peoples, especially in the Americas, have

yet to witness political decolonization, and cultural decolonization is
now nearly impossible. Moreover, politically, indigenous claims challenge a nation state's assertion of complete political and territorial
* Mary Ellen Turpel, Assistant Professor, Dalhousie Law School, Halifax, Nova
Scotia; Member, Indigenous Bar Association, Canada.
1. Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur, Study of the Problem of DiscriminationAgainst
Indigenous Populations, 578, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8.
2. I use the term "indigenous" throughout this paper. I prefer this term to
"Indian" or "native," which have paternalistic and offensive connotations. In Canada, the expression "aboriginal" is employed in the Constitution Act, 1982 to refer
to indigenous peoples including the Metis and the Inuit. Consequently, I use this
expression when making particular references to Canadian texts.
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sovereignty.
Indigenous peoples are entrapped peoples-enclaves with distinct
cultural, linguistic, political and spiritual attributes surrounded by the
dominant society. Indigenous peoples find themselves caught in the
confines of a subsuming, and frequently hostile, state political apparatus
imposed by an immigrant or settler society following colonization.
Moreover, indigenous peoples, particularly in the Americas, are surrounded by a dominant consumer culture that threatens their very way
4
of life. Indigenous peoples are truly "nations within."
Indigenous claims are multifaceted because they bring together
requests for land, requests for autonomy from the political structures
and cultural hegemony of dominant "settler" societies, and pleas for
respect for their distinct indigenous cultural and spiritual world views.
The claims also seek redress for systemic discrimination against indigenous peoples in the legal (criminal justice) and political systems, the
social services sector, and the workforce. Indigenous claims unite legal,
historical, political, moral, and humanitarian arguments in a body of
doctrine that may be viewed as a third generation of international
human rights law focussing on the uniquely collective nature of indigenous claims. This new generation of human rights has been termed the
rights of peoples. 5
The work of the United Nations during the past two decades has
significantly legitimized indigenous peoples' claims. 6 Recent efforts of
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in preparing
a draft declaration of international principles on indigenous rights represents considerable advancement toward international acceptance of
collective human rights and international recognition of the need for
norms to respond to indigenous claims. In some states, there have also
been rising efforts to respond to indigenous claims in the domestic context, often with terms of the debate set by international norms and
developments. Canada is a state where growing concern for indigenous
peoples' treatment and a strong public desire to settle indigenous claims
have made these issues central to the nation's political and constitutional agendas.
In this regard, it is fair to report that Canada is now undergoing
pronounced political strains. Debates regarding the future of the Province of Quebec in Canadian Confederation, regional and provincial disagreements over issues of language, the utility of certain political
institutions and the viability or restructuring of economic federation
3. For a collection of essays addressing this theme, see INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
THE NATION-STATE:

FOURTH WORLD POLITICS IN CANADA,

AUSTRALIA

AND

AND NORWAY

(Noel Dyck ed., 1985).
4. It is important to remember that they are thefirst nations. Indeed the largest
organization of indigenous peoples in Canada is called the Assembly of First Nations.

5. See THE

RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1988).
6. For an overview, see Ashjborn Eide, Indigenous Populations and Human Rights:

The UnitedNations Efforts at Midway, in NATIVE

POWER: THE QUEST FOR AUTONOMY AND

NATIONHOOD OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 196 (Jens Brosted et al. eds., 1985).
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have thrown the country into a veritable constitutional crisis. With the
recent ultimatum issued by the Province of Quebec to the rest of Canada
demanding an attractive constitutional reform package or separation
from the state, it is clear that the next few years of debate will have both
profound implications and possibilities for indigenous peoples. The
possibilities include nothing less than a reconceptualization of the Canadian nation to accomodate the first nations within.
In the midst of this crisis, demands for justice and recognition of
the inherent right of self-government for indigenous peoples are reaching a crescendo. Indigenous claims are more prominent now than ever
before in Canada's history. Violent confrontations between indigenous
peoples and the police and army over land claims, as occurred at Oka,
Quebec, during the summer of 1990, 7 have catapulted indigenous issues
onto the national political agenda. Constitutional efforts at rapprochement with Quebec have been unsuccessful, at least in part because indigenous people have protested their exclusion from the process of nationbuilding.8 The appointment by the Prime Minister in 1991 of a Royal
Commission on Indigenous Affairs to inquire into a variety of social,
economic and legal problems and the commitment to include aboriginal
concerns "as a key element of the coming round of constitutional discussions" 9 all signal an historic moment for the resolution of indigenous
claims in Canada. How this moment will unfold in the next two years
remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Canada now has an exciting opportunity to resolve indigenous claims-if genuine political will can be harnessed in the endeavor.
Even so, several notes of caution are in order. First, until now the
extent to which indigenous peoples have been active participants in
Canadian constitutional renovation, or national policy formulation, has
been severely circumscribed by both opportunity and will. Indigenous
peoples, as groups or distinct collectivities, have not been given the
opportunity to participate in national political affairs. In the early postcontact era indigenous peoples were viewed as inferior, as "les sauvage." Since the 1960s, indigenous peoples have been seen principally as
same right to participate as other
enfranchised individuals with the 10
vote.
to
Canadian citizens-namely
7. See The Summer of 1990, The Fifth Report of the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, 34th Parliament, 2nd Session (tabled in the House
of Commons in May 1991). Violent confrontations over land are not limited to the
Mohawk situation, although this was the most explosive. Conflicts in Temagami,
Ontario, with the Nishnabe, and in British Columbia with the Lil'luwat people are
two other of many examples.
8. See M. E. Turpel & P. A. (Trisha) Monture, Ode to Eljah: Reflections of Two First
Nations Women at the Wake for the Meech Lake Accord, 15 QUEEN'S L.J. 345 (1990).
9. Notes for an address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, First Nations Congress, Victoria, B.C. 2 (April 23, 1991) (unpublished notes available upon request

from the author).
10. The federal Indian Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-5 (1985) (Can.) was amended in 1960 to

permit "Indians," a fictitious legal category applied to indigenous people, to vote in
Canadian elections.
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Furthermore, in terms of will, the desire to participate in national
affairs has been limited by an indigenous political agenda geared toward
autonomy, self-determination, and, less frequently but nevertheless significantly, secession from the Canadian state. As a result, political participation in national affairs is seen as an acceptance of alien state
structures. Some indigenous peoples don't want to engage in existing
structures without the promise of special political accommodation of
indigenous peoples' autonomy or the creation of space for cultural plurality within state structures. If the opportunity to participate as groups
was opened and the options for accommodation of indigenous governments and cultures creatively explored, this would truly be an historic
moment for Canada.
This paper examines the notion of indigenous political participation
rights in light of recent international developments of interest in Canada
and arguably beyond. I will examine international human rights protections of indigenous peoples' political participation rights and the potential impact these emerging concepts could have in Canada. The paper
will address political participation rights as articulated in international
fora and as they are currently developing in Canada within this framework: first, a recent communication by the Mikmaq Tribal Society to the
United Nations Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol
to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;II second, the relationship
between political participation rights and the notion of self-determination; and finally, the domestic implications of the recognition of indigenous peoples' political participation rights in Canada. In particular, the
final part will consider indigenous participation in renewed constitutional reform discussions in Canada and regional initiatives aimed at
including special representatives of indigenous peoples in elected legislative bodies.
I. Mikmaq TribalSociety v. Canada12
In January 1986, the Mikmaq Tribal Society complaint was communicated to the United Nations Human Rights Committee by Grand Chief
Donald Marshall, Grand Captain Alexander Denny and Advisor Simon
11. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/
6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered intoforce March 23, 1976. In force for Canada March
23, 1976, in accordance with Article 9, which provides that the Protocol enters into
force three months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the
tenth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession. As of December 1990, 92

states have ratified the Covenant and 51 have acceded to the Optional Protocol. Mul-

tilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretaty-General, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E./9
(1990).
12. Aiikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada, (No. 205/1986), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/
205/1986 (1990) (Human Rights Committee admissibility decision released July 20,
1990) [hereinafter Mikmaq Admissibility Decision]; Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986 (1991) (Human Rights Committee final decision
released Dec. 3, 1991) [hereinafter 1Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada].
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Marshall, the officers of the Mikmaq Tribal Society in Canada.' 3 The
final decision of the Committee was released in December 1991, almost
t4
six years after the submission of the initial complaint.
The Mikmaq are an indigenous people with a traditional "Grand
Council" governing the seven territorial districts in the Mikmaq alliance.
The word "Mikmaq" means the allied people and the Mikmaq nation is
a friendly alliance of indigenous peoples who occupy what is called
"Mikmakik," or the land of friendships. This territory includes what are
now known as Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince
Edward Island, the Gaspe peninsula, Magdalene archipelago, and St.
Pierre and Michelon of both Canada and France. 15
The communication from the Mikmaq Tribal Society to the U.N.
Human Rights Commission was not the first brought against Canada by
indigenous peoples pursuant to the machinery established under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Two other complaints have progressed through the Human
6
Rights Committee's meandering review process: Lovelace v. Canada'
and Ominayak v. Canada.17 The Mikmaq's recent communication illustrates the limitations of the U.N.'s individual petition mechanism as a
method of scrutinizing indigenous peoples' human rights violations.
The process is curiously slow and it suffers procedural and substantive
limitations.
Mikmaq leaders submitted the communication in two capacities-as
individuals claiming to be victims of human rights violations and as
trustees protecting the welfare and the rights of the Mikmaq people:
"The authors are members of the traditional national council of
13. An initial Mikmaq communication to the Human Rights Committee in 1980,
A.D. v. Canada (No. 78/1988), was denied admission on the grounds that the author
was unable to provide documentation supporting his claim to represent the Mikmaq
people.
14. This delay, in itself, speaks volumes about the efficacy of the United Nations
in the area of human rights and indigenous peoples.
15. For further information on Mikmaq people, history, and political aspirations,
see Mi'kmaw Chiefs, The Covenant Chain, in DRUMBEAT: ANGER AND RENEWAL IN
INDIAN COUNTRY 106 (Boyce Richardson ed., 1989).
16. Lovelace v. Canada, (No. 24/1977) Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981). This communication concerned state-imposed gender discrimination in the determination of membership in indigenous communities. Canada was found to be in violation of its
obligations to protect minority rights under Article 27 of the Covenant. For further
analysis, see Anne F. Bayefsky, The Human Rights Committee and the Case of Sandra Lovelace, 20 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 244 (1982).
17. Ominayak v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (Human Rights
Committee decision released March 28, 1990). This complaint focussed on an
unresolved longstanding land claim by the Lubicon Cree in Alberta. The author of
the communication was the Chief of the Lubicon Cree band. Canada was found to be
in violation of the Covenant, but the Committee found that efforts had been taken to
correct the situation. Id. 33. There has also been a successful complaint brought
against Sweden by an indigenous person with respect to violations of traditional
hunting rights. See Kitok v. Sweden, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (Human
Rights Committee decision released August 10, 1988).
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Mikmakik, and their interest in this matter is twofold: as victims themselves, and as trustees for the welfare and rights of the people as a
whole."' 8 The communication is novel in this regard because the
Optional Protocol complaint procedure emphasizes individual petitions
to the Human Rights Committee. The Optional Protocol mechanism
enables the Human Rights Committee to monitor domestic enforcement
of a particular petitioner's human rights by a state party. Communications alleging violations of international human rights norms must be
submitted by named individuals in order to be admitted by the Committee and reviewed on the merits.
This requirement presents a conundrum for indigenous peoples
because the human rights violations they suffer are not simply individual
in nature; they are typically collective and include deprivations of lands,
culture and political status.1 Although indigenous people are individually affected by the denial of collective human rights, the source of their
suffering is generally inseparable from the oppression experienced by
the people as a group. The extent to which the complaint process can
be adapted to address indigenous peoples communications will shape
the capability (and illustrate the willingness) of United Nations human
rights institutions to deal with these unique claims. The dual nature
(individual and collective) of the authorship and representativity in the
communication from the Mikmaq Tribal Society was pivotal to the types
of violations that were alleged to have been committed by Canada. Process and substance were interrelated in this regard in the complaint.
The Mikmaq Tribal Society communication alleged violations by
Canada of rights protected in Article I of the Covenant-the right of
self-determination. Article I guarantees that "all peoples have the right
to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."' 20 In recognizing the right of all peoples to self-determination, Article I confirms a principle widely accepted in many interna2
tional human rights instruments. 1
The Mikmaq Tribal Society communication alleged that Canada's
aboriginal constitutional reform discussion process, held from March
1984 to 1987, violated international human rights standards because
Mikmaq people were excluded from the discussions regarding future
18. Mikmaq Trbal Society Communication, submitted January 1986,

48 [hereinafter

Mikmaq Communication].
19. For further development, see Russel Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging
Object of InternationalLaw, 80 AM.J. INT'L L. 369 (1986), and Douglas Sanders, The Re-

Emergence of Indigenous Questions in InternationalLaw, 1 CANADIAN
BOOK 3 (1983).

HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR-

20. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Dec.
16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 entered into force March 23, 1976.
21. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CHARTER art. 1(2); InternationalCovenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force on
Jan. 3, 1976, Art. 1(I).
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relationships between the Crown and indigenous peoples. The Mikmaq
Tribal Society pointed to section 37(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
the provision establishing the process, to argue that Canada had
abridged their right to self-determination:
37(1) A constitutional conference composed of the Prime Minister of
Canada and the first ministers of the provinces shall be convened by the
Prime Minister of Canada within one year after this Part comes into force.
(2) The conference convened under subsection (1) shall have included
in its agenda an item respecting constitutional matters that directly affect
the aboriginal peoples of Canada, including the identification and definition of
the rights of these peoples to be included in the Constitution of Canada,
and the Prime Minister of Canada shall22invite representatives of those peoples to
participatein the discussions on that item.
The Mikmaq Tribal Society argued that the meetings, convened by the
Prime Minister according to this section of the Canadian Constitution,
excluded them despite their specific written requests to participate in
discussions of importance to their future. 2 3 Canada responded that
direct discussions with the Mikmaq Tribal Society were not practical at
the constitutional table and that national indigenous umbrella organizations, such as the Assembly of First Nations, could adequately negotiate
future political arrangements on behalf of the Mikmaq. 24 This position
was challenged by the Mikmaq Tribal Society as racist since the government's stance rested on the premise: "that any members of the 'Indian'
race can exercise the Mikmaq people's right to self-determination. ' 25
The Mikmaq claimed that this denied their collective rights to make representations about their political status and desired forms of affiliation
with the state. The Assembly of First Nations, the national indigenous
organization in Canada, supported the Mikmaq in their efforts to secure
representation at the constitutional table.
The Human Rights Committee has demonstrated an unwillingness
to consider allegations of denial of the right to self-determination
because this area is politically charged. States, whose participation in
the process is optional, might withdraw support for the Committee's
complaints process. Moreover, consideration of self-determination
questions involves a determination of whether the complainant consti22. Constitution Act, 1982, § 37(1) (Can.) (emphasis added).
23. The Grand Captain of the Mikmaq Grand Council wrote to the Prime Minister on February 2, 1985, requesting that the Council be invited to participate in the
conferences on constitutional issues. On April 27, 1985, the Prime Minister
responded by suggesting "I regret that we cannot invite all aboriginal groups ...I
have no doubt that the interests of all aboriginal peoples will continue to be adequately represented." Mikmaq Communication, supra note 18, Enclosure H.
24. The four indigenous organizations invited to the constitutional table during
the discussions convened pursuant to section 37(1) were: the Assembly of First

Nations, representing so-called "status Indians"; the Native Council of Canada, representing non-status people; the Metis National Council, representing the Metis; and
the Inuit Committee on National Issues, representing. the Inuit (formerly called
"Eskimo").
25. Mihmaq Communication, supra note 18, at 2.
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tutes a "people" under international law, a determination that involves
controversial (and necessarily subjective) questions of politics, anthropology, and law. The Committee's reluctance in this area may explain
its procedural reticence to consider anything other than individual complaints. The more group complaints that are admitted, the more selfdetermination arguments will undoubtedly be made.
However, as noted earlier, indigenous peoples have no forum in
which to advance self-determination claims. The decolonization and
trusteeship process has passed them by, and self-determination claims
are virtually impossible to advance concretely in any other United
Nations fora because states-not peoples-have access to and shape
United Nations institutions. Obviously, any opening for recognition of
peoples at the Human Rights Committee level would represent a breakthrough of enormous psychological significance in the international system. With regard to a previous indigenous complaint, Ominayak v.
Canada, the Committee adopted the view that:
With regard to the State party's contention that the author's communication pertaining to self-determination should be declared inadmissible
because "the Committee's jurisdiction, as defined by the Optional Protocol, cannot be invoked by an individual when the. alleged violation concerns a collective right", the Committee reaffirmed that the Covenant
recognizes and protects in most resolute terms a people's right of selfdetermination and its right to dispose of its natural resources, as an
essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those
rights. However, the Committee observed that the author, as an individual, could not claim under the Optional Protocol to be a victim of a violation of the right of self-determination enshrined in article 1 of26the
Covenant, which deals with rights conferred upon peoples, as such.
Nevertheless, while the Committee appears to reinforce the importance
of self-determination, it would not resolve a complaint alleging violations of Article 1 of the Covenant using, in Ominayak, the excuse that its
process was only open to individuals and self-determination is a collectively-asserted right. Because of this approach, indigenous peoples, like
the Mikmaq, lack an international review procedure to monitor state violation of collective human rights.
It is important in this context to consider the differences between
collective and individual human rights complaints. While an abstract
distinction between individual and collective human rights is often sustained in the literature, it is arguable that this distinction is unworkable.
The collective enjoyment of human rights, such as self-determination, is
a precondition for individual human rights protection; since individuals
do not exist in isolation from a community, repression of the collective
concretely affects individuals, 'particularly indigenous individuals whose
identities are closely connected to their people. Moreover, the nature of
26. OminataA v. Canada, supra note 17, 1 13.3.
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diplomacy and international advocacy is such that it is individuals who
bring forward collective complaints/situations to U.N. fora.
While the Human Rights Committee has established a jurisprudence that considers human rights violations of minorities, it is not
entirely relevant to the indigenous context where peoples' or group
rights are in issue. In Lovelace v. Canada, the Human Rights Committee
found that states have an obligation to protect minority rights and to
ensure indigenous peoples are not deprived of access to their culture.
However, this was not here helpful to the Mikmaq, who do not identify
themselves as a minority. Instead, they asserted that they "were, and
continue to be a separate and distinct people, and were long recognized
as such. .... -27 The authors provided detailed historical evidence to
support their argument that Canada was obliged under the Covenant to
recognize the Mikmaq Tribal Society rights as peoples. They argued:
(i) Mikmakik (the Mikmaq homelands) had long been recognized as an
independent, federal state through the negotiation of Crown treaties and alliances with its national council, the Sante' Mawi'omi or
Grand Council.
(ii) In addition to commercial and defensive arrangements with France
and the United Kingdom extending over two centuries, Mikmakik
received Catholicism under concordat with the Holy See.
(iii) Mikmakik was the first state to recognize the independence of the
United States of America under a military-assistance treaty of 1776.
(iv) A Halifax Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1752, while acknowledging the Mikmaq as British subjects for certain purposes, confirmed the separate national identity and rights of hunting, fishing
and trading
of the Mikmaq throughout what was then Nova
28
Scotia.
The communication alleged that these historical relationships
among the Mikmaq and the French, the British and the Holy See, reveal
a pattern of independence and special political status, and support the
assertion that Mikmakik was never considered as one of Europe's American colonies. Hence, they allege that the Mikmaq have enjoyed, by virtue of their history, the status of a separate and distinct commonwealth
under the British Crown. These assertions in the Mikmaq complaint
speak to a political history which has been disregarded in the institutional and normative shaping of the United Nations where states, not
peoples, are the subjects and objects of international law.
The Canadian Government vigorously opposed the Mikmaq Tribal
Society communication on both procedural and substantive bases. Canada countered that the communication was inadmissible on the following grounds:
(i) The Mikmaq Tribal Society's claim to the right of self-determination could not be "invoked in circumstances that would prejudice
the national unity and territorial integrity of a sovereign state, such
27. Mikmaq Communication, supra note 18,
28. Id. 4Z.

37.
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(ii)

"The Mikmaq tribal society does not constitute a 'people' within the
meaning of article 1 of the Covenant," as the term "people" could
not apply to a "thinly scattered minority
dispersed among the
30
majority" of the Canadian population.
(iii) The right of self-determination is collective in nature and is not
available to individuals. Hence, "the Committee's jurisdiction, as
defined by the Optional Protocol, cannot be invoked when the
alleged violations concern a collective right," and the communication should be dismissed; 3 1 and
(iv) The Halifax Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1752 did not confirm
the existence of the Mikmaq as a separate national entity as "international law and Canadian domestic law do not recognize Indian
treaties as international documents confirming the 3existence
of tri2
bal societies to independent and sovereign states."
The Mikmaq responded to the Government of Canada's submission with
additional comments on their position.3 3 In addition to dispelling the
Government's characterization of their complaint as a threat to national
unity, 34 the Mikmaq Grand Council submitted that independent of any

violation of Article 1 of the Covenant, the actions of Canada also violated Article 25, the provision on political participation.
In response to these submissions, the Human Rights Committee
charted a middle course in its admissibility decision. They concluded
that allegations of violations of self-determination, Article 1, were not
within the competence of the Committee to review given their mandate
in the Optional Protocol. This leaves indigenous peoples with no recognized avenue of redress for their self-determination claims. Consequently, the focus of the legal review in the complaint was shifted to
scrutinize the alleged violation of the Mikmaq Tribal Society's rights
protected under Article 25 of the Covenant.
Article 25, an interesting provision, has not been considered in the
context of indigenous peoples' claims until now. That Article reads:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without reasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guar29. Mikmaq Admissibility Decision, supra note 12, 1 4.2 (summarizing Canada's
objections to admitting the Mikmaq Communication).
30. Id. 4.3.
31. Id. 4.4.
32. Id. 4.5.
33. Submitted March 10, 1987, just weeks before the final round of CanadianAboriginal Constitutional discussions.
34. The Mikmaq suggested, "we are asserting our right to self-determination in a
manner consistent with the national unity of Canada, and merely proposing an alternative of federalism .... " Mikmaq Admissibility Decision, supra note 12, at 1.
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anteeing the free expression of the will of the electors ....35
The first part of this Article, the right to "take part in the conduct of
public affairs," was squarely at issue in the Mikmaq communication,
which claimed that the Mikmaq were excluded from constitutional
discussions.
The ruling on admissibility by the Human Rights Committee was a
36
limited victory for the Mikmaq on the arguments they advanced.
While the Committee refused to determine the issue of Article 1 violation, it did not wholly foreclose the submission of collective human
rights violations so long as these were viewed as a kind of "class action"
of similarly situated individuals:
Notwithstanding the observations in paragraph 14.2 above, the Optional
Protocol does not preclude a group of individuals, who claim to be similarly affected, from together submitting a communication about alleged
breaches of their rights as set out in Part III of the Covenant. Although
initially drafted in terms of an alleged breach of the right of self-determination, the authors, subsequently, and after receiving the State party's
objections to the admissibility of the communication as it then stood,
asserted that the fact that the Mikmaqs were excluded from participating
in the constitutional conferences also reveals a breach of article 25 of the
37
Covenant.
Consequently it admitted the communication to examine whether or not
it disclosed breaches of Article 25.
The Committee suggested further that while Article 1 recognizes
and protects in "the most resolute terms" 38 a people's right of selfdetermination as an essential condition for the effective guarantee,
observance and promotion of individual human rights, this article can
neither be invoked by individuals, nor by peoples under the Optional
Protocol procedure. The Committee did not rule out the applicability of
Article 1 to indigenous peoples at international law but simply ruled out
its competence to address the matter. This is a significant distinction
although hollow for the Mikmaq after an eleven year struggle through
the Human Rights Committee process. Consequently, the Committee
deemed the question of whether the Mikmaq Tribal Society constitutes a
''people" as not relevant to its determination.
The Committee requested additional information from the parties,
within six months, to enable it to determine first, whether the Mikmaqs
35. InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 20. Article 2 prohibits distinctions based on the following grounds: "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status." Id.
36. In response to the ruling, Mikmaq Grand Captain Alexander Denny stated,
"this is a vindication, by the international community, of what we have been trying to
tell Canada for a hundred years. In Ottawa, they are deaf, but not in Geneva." See
Mikmaq Communication on the Decision on Admissibility of the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, press release, August 21, 1990.
37. Mikmaq Admissibility Decision, supra note 12, 14.4.
38. Id. 14.2.
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possessed a collective right as a distinct group to participate in the "conduct of public affairs" and second, whether Canada violated the right:
The Committee believes that there are certain questions of law and facts
relating to article 25(a) of the Covenant that can only be determined on
the merits. The Committee will have to address the issue whether or not
the constitutional conferences constituted a "conduct of public affairs"
and whether the right under article 25(a) is available only to individual
citizens, or to groups or representatives of groups also. In this context,
the Committee would wish to know, in particular, the precise legal nature
conferences, as well
and scope of competence given to the constitutional
39
as the criteria for participation therein.
Both parties submitted further documentation to the Committee and in
December 1991, in its final views on the communication, the Committee
did not find violations of the Covenant. The final decision actually bore
little resemblance to the admissibility decision, leading the Mikmaq people to question the inconsistency in the Committee's reasoning and
interpretation of the Covenant. 40 Before turning to the Committee's
final decision, a brief analysis of political participation rights is useful
given this new twist on indigenous peoples' strategies for human rights
protection.
II. Political Participation and Self-Determination
The admissibility decision in Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada focused
attention directly on Article 25 of the Covenant. The literature on Article 25 of the Covenant emphasizes its second component, the right to
vote, and has largely disregarded the first component, the right to take
part in the conduct of public affairs through chosen representatives. 4 ' A
provision similar to Article 25 is found in Article 21 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights:
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage42and shall be held by secret vote or
by equivalent free voting procedures.
39. Id. 14.6.
40. Letter to the United Nations Centre for Human Rights from Sante Mawi'omi
wjit Mikmaq 3 (January 5, 1992) (on file with author).
41. There is a limited body of literature on this topic. See, e.g., the excellent overview of HenryJ. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARVARD HUM. RTs.
Y.B. 77, 86 (1988). Only passing reference is made to Article 25 in Canadian literature. See W. S. Tarnopolsky, A Comparison Between the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 8 QUEEN'S L.J. 211,
215-216 (1982-83).
42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217 A(III) Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71. General principles expanding this norm can be found in the second draft declaration of indigenous rights being prepared by the United Nations
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. See Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples,
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Although the Universal Declaration provision uses the expression "take
part in the government" rather than "take part in public affairs," the two
provisions are largely identical.
What are political participation rights in the context of indigenous
peoples? As nations within or as entrapped peoples, what rights do they
have to participate in state decision-making and government? How do
these rights relate to the more often voiced aspiration for self-determination?4 3 An appreciation of some distinctions between the right of
self-determination and rights to political participation was not lost on
the authors of the Mikmaq Tribal Society communication:
It is likewise important to distinguish self-determination from the right to
popular participation found in Article 25 of the Covenant. Self-determination is a people's choice of a state and a framework of government, and
for this reason has been described as an essential condition or prerequisite, although not necessarily excluding other conditions, for the genuine
existence of the other human rights and freedoms enumerated in the
Covenant. Popular participation is the right of individuals, subsequent to
Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, at 49. Relevant provisions of the draft are as follows:

21.(a) The right to have their distinct political, social, cultural and economic
characteristics duly reflected in the institutions of the government under
which they live.
(b) The right to full recognition and proper regard to indigenous laws, customs and practices in the legal systems and political institutions of the State.
(c) The right of members of indigenous peoples to participate fully and

without adverse discrimination in the political, economic and social life of the
State. The exercise of this right shall in no way adversely affect the collective
rights of the peoples concerned.
22.(a) The right to participate effectively at the State and international
levels, through representatives freely selected by themselves and by means of
their own choosing, in policy and decision-making and in implementation in
all matters which they consider may affect their rights, lives, and futures.
(b) The right of indigenous peoples to be involved, through appropriate
procedures, determined in conjunction with them, in devising any laws or
administrative measures that may affect them directly, and to obtain their free
and informed consent through implementing such measures. States have the
duty to guarantee the full exercise of these rights.
23.(a) The right to determine, without interference, on matters pertaining
to their own affairs, including, inter alia, control over lands and resources,
social and political relations, dispute resolution, criminal jurisdiction, environmental protection and managements, economic activities, education, culture, traditional religious practices, health, taxation and entry by nonmembers.
(b) The right of indigenous peoples concerned to determine the nature and
structures of their institutions and to select the membership of such institutions according to their own procedures. The duty of States, where the peoples concerned so desire, to recognize such institutions and their
membership through the legal systems and political institutions of the State.
43. It is interesting to note that the discourse on self-determination is abstract
and conceptual in nature while the material on political participation is more concrete and contextualized. Compare Gudmundur Alfredsson, The Right to Seif-Determination in Its Many Manifestations, RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw:
SELECTED ESSAYS ON SELF-DETERMINATION 53 (Ruth Thompson ed., 1987) with
Steiner, supra note 41.
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freely and effectively in
the exercise of self-determination, to participate
44
the state and form of government chosen.
In a complex situation like Canada, where indigenous successionists are
a small minority, the distinction may not be so sharp. Popular participation may require reshaping the framework of government (or federalism) to reconceive the "nation" itself. Nevertheless, even if the Human
Rights Committee had found Canada in violation of its obligation to
enable the Mikmaq to take part in public affairs, the outcome may still
have fallen short of the Mikmaq peoples' aspiration for recognition of
the right of self-determination, including the option of succession. Even
so, it is important to note that political participation rights are not necessarily antithetical to indigenous aspirations for self-determination.
Self-determination is central to the long-term goals of the Mikmaqs and
many indigenous peoples around the world. Self-determination is the
most frequently discussed human rights notion at the United Nations
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. 4 5 Its significance has also been
highlighted in the literature in this area.
The most dynamic issue in international law today is the right to selfdetermination. All other human rights are considered to flow from this
one, because the protection of human rights against government abuses
depends entirely on who governs. It follows that you can assure the prorights and individual freedoms if you have your own
tection of human
46
government.
Self-determination can be conceptualized as requiring that every culturally and historically distinct people have the right to choose its political
status by democratic means, under international supervision, and with
international support. The scope of the right to self-determination will
necessarily differ from case to case depending upon the circumstances of
the people claiming the right and the political context for the realization
of the right. Self-determination would not inevitably cause indigenous
peoples to secede from settler states. 4 7 The exact nature of the political
44. Mikmaq Communication, supra note 18, at 14.
45. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its First Session,
U.N. Doc. E/GN.4/Sub.2/1982/33; Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations
on its Second Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22; Report of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/22; Report of the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1988/24; and Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Seventh Session,
U.N. Doc. E/GN.4/Sub.2/1989/36.
46. Russel Barsh, Indigenous Peoples and the Rights to Self-Determination in International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 68, 69 (Barbara Hocking ed.,

1988).
47. As the Mikmaq pointed out in response to government submissions. See also
the literature on this context: Thomas R. Berger, Native Rights and Self-Determination:

An Address to the Conference on the Voice of Native People, 22 U.W. ONTARIO L. REv. 1
(1984); John H. Clinebell & Jim Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The
Rights of Native Americans Under InternationalLaw, 27 BUFF. L. REv. 669 (1978); and
Eyassu Gayim, The United Nations Law on Self-Determinationof Indigenous Peoples, 51 NoRDICJ. INT'L L. 53 (1982).
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arrangement will depend on the particular context of the people
involved and their aspirations: it could involve autonomous regions
within a federation, municipal-style government, or a variety of other
arrangements. The essential significance of the concept for indigenous
peoples is the right to autonomy over political, social and cultural development, free from state interference. Self-determination is considered
synonymous with self-preservation for indigenous peoples. It would
provide the freedom from state hegemony needed for their survival and
for the transmission of their cultures to future generations.
While these concepts are more expansive than political participation rights and reflect the broad political aspirations of indigenous peoples, the two rights are not necessarily inconsistent. Having worked
fairly extensively in the struggle for the recognition of indigenous peoples' rights in Canada, I see political participation as an essential element of a long-term strategy to achieve autonomy. This is because
recognition of indigenous self-determination will require domestic public support as well as international debate and, ideally, international
supervision. Political participation is necessary to educate both the state
population and the international community about indigenous peoples'
human rights problems and political goals. Without enormous
resources to wage lobby efforts, media campaigns, and educational initiatives, some direct access to the state apparatus is required to get public attention and to mobilize public opinion effectively. Hence,
participation rights may be useful or, more likely, essential on the road
to the recognition of self-determination.
Moreover, for indigenous peoples who do not wish to become
independent states, or who wish to retain an association or affiliation
with larger settler states, rights of political participation are critical for
maintaining a relationship of mutual support and respect. Without
some political participation in national policy formulation, public decision-making, and public-opinion formation, the autonomy or self-government of indigenous peoples in affiliation with larger settler states will
be structured without the input and consent of the indigenous peoples.
Furthermore, their small numbers will mean exclusion from meaningful
decisionmaking. This has been the case in Canada, where successive
governments have felt that they know "what is best" for indigenous peoples and have sought to impose solutions without the consent of the
indigenous peoples. Without participation in national decision-making,
self-government is not meaningful because indigenous self-government
is redefining the nation.
Indigenous participation in the constitutional discussion process in
Canada illustrates the potential power of political participation rights.
The First Nations lobbied extensively and won the right to participate in
multilateral discussions on the reform of the Canadian Constitution with
the federal and provincial governments. 48 This was an historic occasion
48. This process was initiated on March 12, 1992 and ended on August 28, 1992.
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for Canada and was the first time indigenous peoples were welcomed as
full participants in discussions geared toward reshaping the Canadian
federation. Indigenous peoples' governments were included as one of
three orders of government in Canada (along with the federal and provincial orders). As a result of indigenous participation in these discussions, significant changes have been proposed to the Canadian
Constitution to recognize the inherent right of self-government and to
honor the Crown's treaty obligations to the First Nations. These dramatic developments represent very encouraging signs in Canada. However, they were only accomplished, in my view, because of the
participation of indigenous peoples in all aspects of the discussion process. This is the reality of the indigenous movement in Canada. Doctrinaire distinctions do not work at the level of practice where one must be
present and participate to protect rights.
Even if one accepts this pragmatic argument, in states with culturally diverse populations, such as Canada, the right of political participation rights must be articulated to encompass the meaningful
participation of indigenous peoples as peoples. Where indigenous peoples are unrepresented in national political processes, either because of
small numbers, systemic exclusion, or because indigenous peoples have
no interest in those institutions, special processes and structures for
political participation must be developed to respond to the spirit of Article 25(a) of the Covenant. Allowing the Mikmaqs to take part in constitutional conferences in the 1980s through freely chosen representatives
would have fulfilled the obligations in the Covenant; excluding them
would appear to violate it.
Effective political participation would require greater elaboration
and, most likely, structural changes to national political institutions.
This is because indigenous peoples may view participation rights as an
unattractive political option if to exercise their rights they must integrate
into a dominant nation state and relinquish their distinctiveness without
hope of real influence in the national political processes because of their
small numbers. As one author suggests of the imbalance in such
arrangements: "There is a strong suspicion that a colonial power negotiating with a colonized people will enjoy greater bargaining power, and
be able to exact whatever concessions it wishes." 4 9 This is probably
accurate in most circumstances, however, the possibilities cannot be
assessed without looking at the particular state context and indigenous
objectives.
If any narrower interpretation of the right to take part in public
affairs was adopted based on Article 25 (e.g., the right to vote in elections with other "citizens"), it would lend credence to the suggestion
that human rights as articulated by instruments such as the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights are culturally relative and do not universally
49. Barsh, supra note 46, at 71.

1992

Indigenous Peoples' Rights

embrace the human experience. 50 Although it is important for indigenous people to be able to participate in public affairs with the same status as "citizens," this type of participation is clearly insufficient for
several reasons. These include the historic lack of participation by
indigenous peoples in alien political systems, the failure of the partysystem to respond to indigenous concerns, and the Anglo-European
political premise of one-person, one-vote, a view that is antithetical to
the governing traditions of clan and family-based societies.
Self-determination, as a concept in international law, is broader and
more encompassing than political participation rights, although both are
vague, perhaps in a constructive sense. Self-determination recognizes
not only the right simply to participate in political institutions developed
by another state but also peoples' rights to establish their own governing institutions. However, there is a very practical dilemma here. It
is very difficult for indigenous peoples to advocate for self-determination or self-government when they are effectively excluded from public
affairs and do not have a forum in which to advance their aspirations or
generate public support. Inclusion requires more than enfranchisement. As the Mikmaq suggest:
...a state that allows everyone to vote has not necessarily respected their
right to self-determination, nor does it necessarily represent them all
equally. A small people would not likely choose freely to integrate itself
with a very large state, precisely because it would have no real influence
on national-level democratic processes. They would more likely insist
upon some measure of local autonomy. Hence the fact that a small people has in fact been absorbed by a large state, and enjoys the
right to vote,
51
scarcely settles whether they chose this status voluntarily.
Moreover, it scarcely settles the question of whether or not the promise
of participation in Article 25(a) has been met by a state party to the Covenant. The promise of participation in the context of indigenous peoples' experience would require special mechanisms to ensure they are
not marginalized in public affairs, particularly when their futures are
being discussed.

III. Final Views of the Human Rights Committee
When the Human Rights Committee released its final views on the
Mikmaq complaint, it found that Canada had not violated Article 25 of
the Covenant by excluding the Mikmaq from the constitutional discussions in the 1980s. The Mikmaq were again uninvited to attend the
round of constitutional discussions that began in the Spring of 1992 but
did participate through and were represented by the Assembly of First
Nations.
50. See HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979).
51. Mikmaq Communication, supra note 18, 42.
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The Human Rights Committee found that while the constitutional
discussions were part of the conduct of public affairs that require public
participation according to Article 25,52 they are normally attended only
by elected representatives such as the elected leaders of the federal and
provincial governments. The Committee found that an exception was
made for the aboriginal constitutional discussions in the 1980s in order
to invite representatives of the aboriginal peoples. Nevertheless, the
Committee concluded that Article 25 does not require that any affected
group, however large or small, be able to send a representative. This
would be beyond the requirements of the international human rights
obligations in the Covenant as Article 25 cannot be taken to mean that
"every citizen may determine either to take part directly in the conduct
of public affairs or to leave it to freely chosen representatives. It is for
the legal and constitutional system of the State party to provide for the
'5 3
modalities of such participation."
The Human Rights Committee interpreted Article 25 in a negative
way: it focussed on what it could not mean as opposed to what it does
mean or require for a state with indigenous peoples living within the
borders of that state. The Committee found that
[A]rticle 25(a) of the Covenant cannot be understood as meaning that any
directly affected group, large or small, has the unconditional right to
choose the modalities of participation in the conduct of public affairs.
That, in fact, would be an extrapolation of the right to direct participation
by the citizens, far beyond the scope of article 25(a). 54
Sensibly, the government of Canada did not determine their political
approach based on the Committee's position. Clearly, the Committee
did not adequately address the status of indigenous peoples in a state
such as Canada, nor did it distinguish between indigenous peoples and
"groups," which presumably would include public interest groups as
well as peoples.
Consequently, the decision of the Human Rights Committee was a
profound disappointment to the Mikmaq, perhaps even a betrayal of
sorts after the favorable admissibility decision. The Mikmaq were
shocked to learn of the Committee's view that indigenous peoples have
no greater rights to participation, public representation, or involvement,
than individual citizens. This decision consequently appears to limit
communications to the Human Rights Committee to questions of individual human rights violations alone. The door has been closed to selfdetermination complaints, and the door has been effectively closed to
public participation complaints from indigenous groups. The Committee views decisions on participation as exclusively within the domain of
the state based on the theory that the citizens can adequately participate
by electing their political leaders. The future usefulness of the Human
52. Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada, supra note 12,
53. Id. $ 5.4.
54. Id. 5.5.

6.3.
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Rights Committee for indigenous peoples is clearly questionable after
this jurisprudence. After many years of delay, this decision can only be
seen as a disappointment and it reveals an unwillingness to look at the
specific context for indigenous peoples' struggles and how their human
rights situation can be addressed.
IV.

Domestic Implications of Indigenous Political Participation Rights

Despite the Human Rights Committee rejection of the Mikmaq complaint, the struggle for political participation by indigenous peoples in
Canada and elsewhere continues. Two recent developments in Canada
are worthy of mention here. First, indigenous peoples have succeeded
in gaining full participation rights in a new round of Canadian constitutional reform discussions. Second, the options for direct indigenous
political representation in elected legislative assemblies in Canada are
being discussed.
A.

Renewed Canadian Constitutional Reform Discussions

Mikmaq TribalSociety v. Canada questioned Canada's method of selecting
indigenous delegates to participate in constitutional discussions. Consequently, during the most recent round of constitutional discussions,
the pivotal issue for indigenous peoples was their role in the reform process. Access to the process is vital for the indigenous political agenda
because only indigenous leadership can advocate effectively for indigenous peoples.
Even though umbrella organizations cannot adequately represent
indigenous peoples, unless this representation is freely chosen, only
four national indigenous organizations participated in constitutional
reform discussions. This led to some antagonism because indigenous
peoples are not homogeneous; they have divergent histories, cultures,
languages, 5 5 and treaty relationships with the Crown. Grouping indigenous peoples into artificial categories, based on supposed racial characteristics, is repugnant to basic human rights concepts. Nevertheless, the
Human Rights Committee failed to analyze this dimension of the
Mikmaq complaint.
Perhaps in the future political participation in Canada will be structured so that each indigenous people is represented at constitutional
conferences according to cultural and historical factors (e.g., by tribe or
treaty). This would be preferable to viewing indigenous peoples as
members of the same "race." Indigenous peoples must be invited to
take part so that their interests are represented by their own freely
selected people. This may lead to alliances. Certainly, indigenous alliances, such as the Haudenosaunee or Iroquois Confederacy of the Six
Nations, have been an integral part of Canadian history. However, the
55. Just to give a sense of the diversity, there are 53 aboriginal languages spoken
in Canada.
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point is that indigenous peoples must freely choose their alliances and,
in turn, their representatives.
Article 25 of the Covenant is of obviously limited assistance and
also of little significance in Canada. The Mikmaq decision had little or
no political influence on the demands for participation pressed for by
indigenous peoples during the recent round of constitutional discussions. It is fair to say that the influence of international human rights
jurisprudence pales in comparison to the influence of indigenous peoples taking to the streets and demonstrating to promote and protect
their human rights.
The full involvement of indigenous peoples in the current discussions on constitutional reform has been facilitated by state support.
Indigenous peoples, even in a wealthy country such as Canada, cannot
meaningfully participate in politics without assistance from the state
treasury. The state treasury has been willing to fund the participation of
indigenous peoples because the Canadian government appears to realize that the public legitimacy of the Canadian constitutional structure
requires full inclusion of indigenous peoples and the redress of their
outstanding claims. Moreover, worthwhile political participation must
include the rights to speak in national policy or constitutional discussions, to assist in defining the agenda, to promote ongoing community
participation, 5 6 to vote on resolutions, and to enjoy the full privileges of
participants in the process. At this point in Canada, indigenous people
have exercised all of these rights. Nevertheless, the political power to
stop constitutional reforms does not formally exist in the existing constitutional paradigm; the ultimate recourse for indigenous peoples is still
public opinion.
The notion of equal participation by indigenous peoples in the constitutional reform process has been criticized by some in Canada as too
generous. The argument has been raised that these representatives are
not democratically elected as are Canadian politicians. But this argument can be challenged itself as anti-democratic. Truly representative
forms of government, the hallmark of democracy, must include all constituent peoples living within the state and should respect their political
and constitutional structures. Indigenous peoples have been historically
excluded from the political institutions of the Canadian state and indeed
only received the vote (which few exercise) thirty years ago. Canadian
politicians, in representing primarily only two constituent peoples in
Canada (the French and English settlers), do not represent indigenous
interests and cannot replace indigenous participation. Only full and
direct participation of indigenous peoples will lead to creative political
arrangements able to reduce violent confrontations between indigenous
peoples and the Canadian state and to protect the human rights of
indigenous peoples.
56. For example, to bring together advisors, support policy development, and
permit regular community consultation.
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Indigenous Representatives in Elected Legislative Assemblies

There has been considerable recent discussion in Canada regarding special political participation rights for indigenous peoples in elected legislative assemblies in Canada. Most of this discussion has focused on
Mikmaq representation in the legislature of the Province of Nova Scotia,
although proposals are being actively considered for special representation by indigenous peoples in a refurbished elected Senate or Upper
House of Parliament. The Mikmaq themselves suggested that the election of a Treaty Deputy would ensure that the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship of 1752 would not be abrogated by acts of the provincial
legislature. 57 The Premier of New Brunswick, a province with both
Mikmaq and Maliseet peoples, has supported the proposal. Thus far it
has been imagined that a Mikmaq Treaty Deputy present in the provincial legislature would ensure that matters of consequence for the treaty
relationship with the Crown are adequately addressed. More generally,
the Mikmaq representative could address general political matters of
consequence to the Mikmaq people.
The Mikmaq Grand Council has suggested that a designated seat
would not have to come with voting rights or a veto over legislation; the
aim is not to interfere with the ability of Nova Scotians to govern themselves in matters not affected by the Treaty of 1752. However, the Premier of Nova Scotia has proposed that the representative be given
voting privileges, and discussion regarding the privileges of a Mikmaq
representative are underway. The Deputy could be elected by a special
ballot issued only to Mikmaq people or through a traditional selection
process and could enjoy the same privileges and immunities as regular
members of the legislative assembly, including the rights to participate
in committees and to maintain an office at public expense.
The idea of special indigenous representatives in elected legislative
assemblies finds support in several jurisdictions outside Canada. In the
State of Maine, 58 New Zealand,5 9 Norway and Finland, 60 special
arrangements have been made for indigenous representatives in elected
legislative assemblies. Perhaps the closest parallel to the Nova Scotian
situation is Maine. In the State of Maine, two Penobscot and Passamaquoddy legislative representatives are elected on a special ballot every
two years. This arrangement was not explicitly created by statute or
constitutional provision but was the longstanding practice in the colony
57. Sante' Mawi'omi wjit Mikmaq, A Mikmaq Treaty Deputy in the Legislature
Assembly: A Dynamic Approach to Implementation of the 1752 Treaty of Halifax,
press release, October 15, 1990.
58. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 1-2 (West 1964) (Including representatives
of the Penobscot Indian Nation and the Passamaquoddy Tribe in the legislature).
59. New Zealand Electoral Act of 1956, No. 107, § 23, as amended by Electoral
Amendment Act of 1975, § 8 (establishing Maori electoral districts), 26 R.S.N.Z. 173,
198 (1990); Kenneth A. Palmer, Law, Land and Maori Issues, 3 CANTERBURY L. REv.
322, 326 (1988).
60. See Douglas Sanders, The Sami Parliament in Norway, 1 CAN. NATIVE L. REP. 7

(1990).
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of Massachusetts (which is now, in part, Maine) to send representatives
to Boston to attend sessions of the legislature in order to protect treaty
interests. The current arrangement recognizes this custom, although
the seats are now expressly authorized under the rules of the House of
Representatives and compensation is provided by statute. The representatives do not enjoy voting privileges and cannot introduce bills.
Moreover, the representatives are outside the party system and consequently can preserve the independence and integrity of their
representation.
In New Zealand, the federal House of Representatives has set aside
four standing Maori representatives elected by a special Maori vote.
These representatives address, among other things, matters affecting
the Treaty of Waitangi. In Norway, a special Sami Parliament was established in 1987 and officially opened by the Norwegian King in 1989.
This parliament is composed of thirty-nine members elected every four
years on a special ballot. The parliament operates as an advisory body
to the Norwegian Parliament, much like a similar institution in Finland.
It is anticipated that authority for reindeer herding will be transferred to
the Sami Parliament in the near future. 6 '
Each of these special political arrangements is interesting and worthy of further exploration. However, they represent only a limited
agenda. In many instances, the representation is proforma, participation
and authority are limited, and the arrangements have been structured to
appear as gifts from the legislature instead of structures inherently
required for democratic political processes. Moreover, a lack of access
to the public purse tends to marginalize these special representatives.
Consequently, these models illustrate methods of bringing regional or
national political attention to indigenous peoples' concerns and not
genuine power-sharing.
It may be helpful to conceptualize special indigenous representatives as ambassadors or international representatives of indigenous
communities with a quasi-diplomatic function. This model helps to dispel the impression that indigenous peoples are seeking assimilation into
dominant institutions. They are not. For example, in Canada at least,
assimilation is antithetical to the movement for recognition of an inherent right of self-government. While special seats in elected legislative
assemblies will not satisfy indigenous aspirations in Canada, they may be
an effective means of articulating aspirations and securing gains made in
the recent round of constitutional discussions. As one Mikmaq advisor
speculates:
Treaty federalism offers a framework for managing this cooperation in a
manner consistent with the greatest possible continued autonomy for
both the Mi'kmaq and immigrant communities in Atlantic Canada. The
goal should not be to give either community more power over the other.
Instead, Treaty federalism should ensure that the more powerful commu61. Id. at 8.
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account of the Crown's obligations and
nity (the immigrants) takes due
62
duties to the Mi'kmaq people.
This possibility of representatives reminding politicians of their obligations to indigenous peoples is understandably attractive and probably
critical for long-term change. In the context of the recent constitutional
proposals for an elected federal Senate with indigenous participation, a
double-majority voting power is being considered for indigenous senators over matters materially affecting indigenous language and culture.
Conclusion
While the right of self-determination continues to be the political focus
of the international indigenous movement, the recent jurisprudence of
the Human Rights Committee, particularly the Mikmaq decision, has
done little to resolve the conflicts between indigenous peoples and
states. Although constitutional reform in Canada has provided an
opportunity to focus domestically on some of the human rights
problems that indigenous peoples face, this opportunity was neither
facilitated nor supported by international institutions or forums. Direct
political action and the mobilization of public opinion by indigenous
peoples in Canada provided the necessary impetus.
The decision in the Mikmaq case indicates that the Human Rights
Committee and the United Nations is now out of touch with the struggles of indigenous peoples in Canada, and illustrates the insensitivity of
these bodies to the political context of indigenous peoples' situations.
The international system remains a system of states thoroughly controlled by state agendas and institutions. Indigenous peoples are outsiders at every turn. Even the little opening that has occurred at the
United Nations, the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, is still years
away from developing a declaration on indigenous peoples' rights. Progress on such a declaration has been hindered by the conservatism and
reticence of the state participants in the Working Group to recognize
that indigenous peoples do have a right of self-determination.
In Canada, indigenous peoples will not wait for the United Nations
to pronounce on rights that indigenous peoples understand as inherently theirs. The right to govern one's own people and to establish relationships of respect and mutual support with the larger settler state is a
daunting political challenge but one which indigenous people in Canada
are prepared to take on, with or without international assistance or
supervision. Ideally, new pathways broken in Canada can assist other
indigenous peoples beyond Canada who do not enjoy the public support
and acceptance necessary to engage directly in constitutional reform discussions. It may also be the case that before effective changes are made
in international fora, actual movement is required at a state level, such
62. James Youngblood (Sakej) Henderson, Treaty Federalism 40 (unpublished

paper, on file with author).
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as in Canada, in order to promote the international recognition of indigenous peoples' status and rights.
From the Canadian perspective, the United Nations and the Human
Rights Committee have been of virtually no assistance in indigenous
struggles. With the outrageous delays in the consideration of communications, the Human Rights Committee is of use only to those who have
years to wait for their rights to be considered. Even then, for indigenous
peoples, the track record is disappointingly poor; Committee members
are insensitive to indigenous peoples' predicament in the international
system. As "nations within," indigenous peoples in Canada will define a
political space and relationship with Canada that is appropriate from an
indigenous perspective. Unfortunately, the United Nations will not be
remembered as playing any significant role in the profound changes that
are now underway in Canada which are nothing short of the beginning
of the decolonization of indigenous peoples.

